Monetary incentives and peer referral in promoting secondary distribution of HIV self-testing among men who have sex with men in China: A randomized controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Digital network-based methods may enhance peer distribution of HIV self-testing (HIVST) kits, but interventions that can optimize this approach are needed. We aimed to assess whether monetary incentives and peer referral could improve a secondary distribution program for HIVST among men who have sex with men (MSM) in China. METHODS AND FINDINGS: Between October 21, 2019 and September 14, 2020, a 3-arm randomized controlled, single-blinded trial was conducted online among 309 individuals (defined as index participants) who were assigned male at birth, aged 18 years or older, ever had male-to-male sex, willing to order HIVST kits online, and consented to take surveys online. We randomly assigned index participants into one of the 3 arms: (1) standard secondary distribution (control) group (n = 102); (2) secondary distribution with monetary incentives (SD-M) group (n = 103); and (3) secondary distribution with monetary incentives plus peer referral (SD-M-PR) group (n = 104). Index participants in 3 groups were encouraged to order HIVST kits online and distribute to members within their social networks. Members who received kits directly from index participants or through peer referral links from index MSM were defined as alters. Index participants in the 2 intervention groups could receive a fixed incentive ($3 USD) online for the verified test result uploaded to the digital platform by each unique alter. Index participants in the SD-M-PR group could additionally have a personalized peer referral link for alters to order kits online. Both index participants and alters needed to pay a refundable deposit ($15 USD) for ordering a kit. All index participants were assigned an online 3-month follow-up survey after ordering kits. The primary outcomes were the mean number of alters motivated by index participants in each arm and the mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants in each arm. These were assessed using zero-inflated negative binomial regression to determine the group differences in the mean number of alters and the mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants. Analyses were performed on an intention-to-treat basis. We also conducted an economic evaluation using microcosting from a health provider perspective with a 3-month time horizon. The mean number of unique tested alters motivated by index participants was 0.57 ± 0.96 (mean ± standard deviation [SD]) in the control group, compared with 0.98 ± 1.38 in the SD-M group (mean difference [MD] = 0.41),and 1.78 ± 2.05 in the SD-M-PR group (MD = 1.21). The mean number of newly tested alters motivated by index participants was 0.16 ± 0.39 (mean ± SD) in the control group, compared with 0.41 ± 0.73 in the SD-M group (MD = 0.25) and 0.57 ± 0.91 in the SD-M-PR group (MD = 0.41), respectively. Results indicated that index participants in intervention arms were more likely to motivate unique tested alters (control versus SD-M: incidence rate ratio [IRR = 2.98, 95% CI = 1.82 to 4.89, p-value < 0.001; control versus SD-M-PR: IRR = 3.26, 95% CI = 2.29 to 4.63, p-value < 0.001) and newly tested alters (control versus SD-M: IRR = 4.22, 95% CI = 1.93 to 9.23, p-value < 0.001; control versus SD-M-PR: IRR = 3.49, 95% CI = 1.92 to 6.37, p-value < 0.001) to conduct HIVST. The proportion of newly tested testers among alters was 28% in the control group, 42% in the SD-M group, and 32% in the SD-M-PR group. A total of 18 testers (3 index participants and 15 alters) tested as HIV positive, and the HIV reactive rates for alters were similar between the 3 groups. The total costs were $19,485.97 for 794 testers, including 450 index participants and 344 alter testers. Overall, the average cost per tester was $24.54, and the average cost per alter tester was $56.65. Monetary incentives alone (SD-M group) were more cost-effective than monetary incentives with peer referral (SD-M-PR group) on average in terms of alters tested and newly tested alters, despite SD-M-PR having larger effects. Compared to the control group, the cost for one more alter tester in the SD-M group was $14.90 and $16.61 in the SD-M-PR group. For newly tested alters, the cost of one more alter in the SD-M group was $24.65 and $49.07 in the SD-M-PR group. No study-related adverse events were reported during the study. Limitations include the digital network approach might neglect individuals who lack internet access. CONCLUSIONS: Monetary incentives alone and the combined intervention of monetary incentives and peer referral can promote the secondary distribution of HIVST among MSM. Monetary incentives can also expand HIV testing by encouraging first-time testing through secondary distribution by MSM. This social network-based digital approach can be expanded to other public health research, especially in the era of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). TRIAL REGISTRATION: Chinese Clinical Trial Registry (ChiCTR) ChiCTR1900025433.

Partner-delivered HIV self-test kits with and without financial incentives in antenatal care and index patients with HIV in Malawi: a three-arm, cluster-randomised controlled trial.

BACKGROUND: Secondary distribution of HIV self-testing (HIVST) kits by patients attending clinic services to their partners could improve the rate of HIV diagnosis. We aimed to investigate whether secondary administration of HIVST kits, with or without an additional financial incentive, via women receiving antenatal care (ANC) or via people newly diagnosed with HIV (ie, index patients) could improve the proportion of male partners tested or the number of people newly diagnosed with HIV. METHODS: We did a three-arm, open-label, pragmatic, cluster-randomised trial of 27 health centres (clusters), eligible if they were a government primary health centre providing ANC, HIV testing, and ART services, across four districts of Malawi. We recruited women (aged ≥18 years) attending their first ANC visit and whose male partner was available, not already taking ART, and not already tested for HIV during this pregnancy (ANC cohort), and people (aged ≥18 years) with newly diagnosed HIV during routine clinic HIV testing who had at least one sexual contact not already known to be HIV-positive (index cohort). Centres were randomly assigned (1:1:1), using a public selection of computer-generated random allocations, to enhanced standard of care (including an invitation for partners to attend HIV testing services), HIVST only, or HIVST plus a US$10 financial incentive for retesting. The primary outcome for the ANC cohort was the proportion of male partners reportedly tested, as ascertained by interview with women in this cohort at day 28. The primary outcome for the index cohort was the geometric mean number of new HIV-positive people identified per facility within 28 days of enrolment, as measured by observed HIV test results. Cluster-level summaries compared intervention with standard of care by intention to treat. This trial is registered with ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT03705611. FINDINGS: Between Sept 8, 2018, and May 2, 2019, nine clusters were assigned to each trial arm, resulting in 4544 eligible women in the ANC cohort (1447 [31·8%] in the standard care group, 1465 [32·2%] in the HIVST only group, and 1632 [35·9%] in HIVST plus financial incentive group) and 708 eligible patients in the index cohort (234 [33·1%] in the standard care group, 169 [23·9%] in the HIVST only group, and 305 [42·9%] in the HIVST plus financial incentive group). 4461 (98·2%) of 4544 eligible women in the ANC cohort and 645 (91·1%) of 708 eligible patients in the index cohort were recruited, of whom 3378 (75·7%) in the ANC cohort and 439 (68·1%) in the index cohort were interviewed after 28 days. In the ANC cohort, the mean proportion of reported partner testing per cluster was 35·0% (SD 10·0) in the standard care group, 73·0% in HIVST only group (13·1, adjusted risk ratio [RR] 1·71, 95% CI 1·48-1·98; p<0·0001), and 65·2% in the HIVST plus financial incentive group (11·6, adjusted RR 1·62, 1·45-1·81; p<0·0001). In the index cohort, the geometric mean number of new HIV-positive sexual partners per cluster was 1·35 (SD 1·62) for the standard care group, 1·91 (1·78) for the HIVST only group (incidence rate ratio adjusted for number eligible as an offset in the negative binomial model 1·65, 95% CI 0·49-5·55; p=0·3370), and 3·20 (3·81) for the HIVST plus financial incentive group (3·11, 0·99-9·77; p=0·0440). Four self-resolving, temporary marital separations occurred due to disagreement in couples regarding HIV self-test kits. INTERPRETATION: Although administration of HIVST kits in the ANC cohort, even when offered alongside a financial incentive, did not identify significantly more male patients with HIV than did standard care, out-of-clinic options for HIV testing appear more acceptable to many male partners of women with HIV, increasing test uptake. Viewed in the current context, this approach might allow continuation of services despite COVID-19-related lockdowns. FUNDING: Unitaid, through the Self-Testing Africa Initiative.

Pay to skip the line: The political economy of digital testing services for HIV and other sexually transmitted infections.

The value of digital healthcare has been lauded in Canada at local, provincial, and national levels. Digital medicine is purported to enhance patient access to care while promising cost savings. Using institutional ethnography, we examined the potential for publicly funded digital testing for HIV and other sexually transmitted infections (STI) in Ontario, Canada. Our analyses draw from 23 stakeholder interviews with healthcare professionals conducted between 2019 and 2020, and textual analyses of government documents and private, for-profit digital healthcare websites. We uncovered a "two-tiered" system whereby private digital STI testing services enable people with economic resources to "pay to skip the line" queuing at public clinics and proceed directly to provide samples for diagnostics at local private medical labs. In Ontario, private lab corporations compete for fee-for-service contracts with government, which in turn organises opportunities for market growth when more patient samples are collected vis-à-vis digital testing. However, we also found that some infectious disease specimens (e.g., HIV) are re-routed for analysis at government public health laboratories, who may be unable to manage the increase in testing volume associated with digital STI testing due to state budget constraints. Our findings on public-private laboratory funding disparities thus discredit the claims that digital healthcare necessarily generates cost savings, or that it enhances patients' access to care. We conclude that divergent state funding relations together with the creeping privatisation of healthcare within this "universal" system coordinate the conditions through which private corporations capitalise from digital STI testing, compounding patient access inequities. We also stress that our findings bring forth large scale implications given the context of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the rapid diffusion of digital healthcare, together with significant novel coronavirus testing activities initiated by private industry.